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Abstract 
How do former armed militants exercise local political power after civil wars end? Building on 
recent advances in the study of “rebel rulers” and local goods provision by armed groups, this 
article offers a typology of ex-rebel commander authority that emphasizes two dimensions of 
former militants’ power: local-level ties to civilian populations ruled during civil war, and 
national-level ties to post-conflict state elites. Put together, these dimensions produce four 
trajectories of ex-rebel authority. These trajectories shape whether and how ex-rebel commanders 
provide social goods within post-conflict communities and the durability of ex-rebels’ local 
authority over time. We illustrate this typology with qualitative evidence from northern Côte 
d’Ivoire. The framework yields theoretical insights about local orders after civil war, as well as 
implications for peacebuilding policies. 
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There is a growing recognition that former members of armed movements play important roles in 
local goods provision and peacebuilding in states recovering from violent internal conflict. When 
civil wars are ongoing, non-state armed groups and their local-level commanders often become 
involved in day-to-day affairs in communities under their control, including the provision of 
security and policing, dispute resolution, and even education and health care.2 These “rebel 
governance” practices fill the vacuum of social order created by civil war. They can also form 
enduring patterns that persist into peacetime politics.3 In many post-conflict states, former 
combatant leaders play prominent roles not only as members of unified armed forces, but also as 
non-military bureaucratic appointees, elected politicians, economic entrepreneurs and informal 
local strongmen.4  
Yet the nature of former armed group members’ local authority can vary dramatically. 
For example, since the end of the armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2011), former 
commanders of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel group have played diverse roles in local affairs. 
Some of these individuals exercise political clout in a formal capacity as elected officials, 
members of the Ivorian armed forces, or as civil servants of the post-conflict state. In 
approximately one in five sub-prefectures controlled by the rebel group during the civil war, a 
former FN member now holds an elected position.5 In other areas, former FN commanders 
exercise power through informal channels based primarily on ties to networks of former rank-
and-file combatants, as well as ongoing relationships with community leaders. In yet other cases, 
once-powerful rebel commanders have withdrawn from local politics altogether.  
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These differences in the local authority of former armed group leaders are fundamental to 
understanding peacebuilding and political order in war-torn societies. Yet existing research 
offers limited insight into this highly varied phenomenon. Where ex-rebels participate in post-
conflict politics, scholars often treat these actors either as powerful Leviathans who take 
command of state institutions in order to bend them to their will,6 or as entrenched “warlords” 
who continue their own self-enrichment at the expense of ordinary citizens.7 These 
categorizations mask a more nuanced set of trajectories that define former militants’ social and 
political positions, their roles in local goods provision, and their relationships vis-à-vis the post-
conflict state. Former commanders and local insurgent organizers sometimes fade out of the 
political arena entirely, or continue providing social goods informally outside of the institutional 
channels of the state. In other cases, warlords and militia leaders are promoted to high-level 
government offices, but lose influence over events on the ground. In short, just as the onset of 
civil wars can create new and complex constellations of political order, so too does the transition 
to peace bring remarkably varied transformations to the local authority of non-state armed group 
members. 
This article provides a new conceptual typology to describe and theorize patterns of ex-
rebel authority. By “ex-rebels” we refer specifically to individuals who comprised the mid-level 
organizational leadership of non-state armed groups. These are the members who are directly 
involved in wartime operations as field commanders, commissars, or local political bosses. We 
disentangle two distinct dimensions of these ex-rebels’ power: (1) local-level ties developed with 
populations within their areas of wartime rule, and (2) national-level ties formed with capital-
based elites. Put together, these dimensions produce four distinct trajectories: predation, 
benevolent warlordism, state capture, and rebels-into-statesmen. Our typology is simple but 
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powerful, summarizing how these different dimensions interact to shape how former local 
militant leaders participate in goods provision, as well as the ability of these actors to withstand 
political challenges over time. The article illustrates the typology using examples from the war-
to-peace transition in Côte d’Ivoire, where rebel field commanders and political commissars 
varied greatly in their post-conflict trajectories. We also show that our typology applies more 
broadly, capturing patterns of ex-rebel authority in other protracted conflicts where non-state 
armed groups controlled territory and retained local influence beyond the official termination of 
violence.8 
This conceptual brush-clearing exercise is a necessary step towards more nuanced 
theorizing about post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding. Former non-state armed groups 
play a pivotal role determining how social order is produced, how public goods are provided, and 
the likelihood for violent remobilization in war-torn societies.9 By thinking about ex-rebel 
authority as a multi-dimensional variable, our typology helps analysts conceptually map out the 
complex transformations to local politics that occur when armed groups demobilize or assimilate 
their personnel into the state. Importantly, our framework distinguishes between patterns of 
authority that are likely to hinder statebuilding and peacebuilding, versus scenarios where former 
rebels can contribute to the welfare of their societies.  
Understanding differences in the quality of ex-rebel authority also has important policy 
implications. International interveners must confront and navigate the local influence of former 
mid-level rebel actors when dealing with a variety of policy problems, such as controlling flows 
of illicit goods and persons, responding to humanitarian crises, or attempting to bolster the 
capacity of partner governments.10 Even when ex-rebel commanders submit to disarmament and 
state integration, this need not entail the dismantlement of their informal wartime networks.11 It 
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matters whether the authority of these ex-rebels is based primarily on their local wartime 
credentials or on their ties to national-level elites, since the effectiveness and consequences of 
efforts to co-opt or dislodge these actors may be very different in these scenarios.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. After reviewing the existing literature and 
describing our theoretical typology, we illustrate each category of ex-rebel authority with 
evidence based on field research in northern Côte d’Ivoire. We also demonstrate the 
generalizability of our typology by drawing on secondary cases. In the final section, we outline 
fruitful lines of research generated by our analysis.  
 
Studying the Post-conflict Politics of Rebel Authority 
In the last decade a growing wave of literature has emerged on two previously understudied 
dimensions of civil wars. First, an important research agenda now exists around the provision of 
governance by non-state armed actors.12 This literature highlights that, in addition to 
conventional military capabilities, insurgent groups often develop administrative institutions and 
service delivery mechanisms within territorially based “anti-states” that facilitate social control 
over civilian populations.13 Second, scholars are paying more attention to the roles of former 
belligerents as participants in local peacebuilding.14 For instance, ex-rebels and former militia 
group leaders can facilitate state authority in peripheral areas by brokering connections and 
exchanges of resources and information with central political elites.15 Former rebels can also 
“reinvent themselves” as agents of political parties or non-government organizations that are 
involved primarily in civilian affairs.16  
These research streams shed light on how wartime political orders emerge, how 
populations access basic services in conflict zones, and how armed movements participate in 
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formal politics or return to violence after civil wars end. Despite these advances, however, we 
lack an analytical framework that connects the emergence of different wartime orders under non-
state armed groups to the post-conflict authority of middle-tier ex-rebel actors, and that accounts 
for the highly varied nature of these individuals’ local political power. This lacuna reflects two 
features of the existing literature. 
First, there is a strong prescriptive focus in much of the literature, with many studies 
equating the local authority of ex-rebel commanders with criminality and state failure.17 For 
example, scholars warn against predatory “warlords” who maintain their power through “their 
ability to manipulate the dangling bureaucratic structures of weak states.”18 Anders Themnér 
recognizes this tendency in the peacebuilding literature more broadly, noting that “to the extent 
that the agency of individual military leaders is acknowledged, scholars commonly frame it in 
negative terms, where the goal of peacemaking should be to find ways to channel political power 
through parties rather than individuals, and through civilian leaders rather than the military.”19 In 
contrast, other analysts adopt a normative stance in favor of “hybrid” forms of post-conflict 
governance that incorporate ex-rebels as peacebuilding partners.20 Kate Meagher, for instance, 
notes that research focusing on hybrid forms of post-conflict governance has tended to 
“celebrate” these arrangements “as a vehicle of embedded forms of order and authority.”21  
In other words, whereas scholars of warlordism often cast ex-rebel leaders as incorrigible 
peace spoilers, critics of externally-imposed liberal peacebuilding characterize the authority of 
former commanders as a positive reflection of “local ownership” in the reconstruction process. 
We argue that both perspectives are partially correct, but remain theoretically underspecified. 
The influence of former armed actors can be predatory and extractive, but also locally embedded 
and welfare-enhancing.  
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A second limitation is that much past research aims to understand the effects of former 
rebels’ political authority for other outcomes — such as the renewal of political violence,22 party 
building,23 or democratization24 — rather than to investigate the endurance or decline of that 
authority itself.  Although there are empirical studies of cases where former rebel organizations 
withdrew from formal politics, such as the RUF in Sierra Leone,25 these studies rarely identify 
the conditions under which specific ex-rebel commanders withdraw (or are pushed out) from 
local political positions.   
The most promising work, in our view, has conceptualized local political orders in 
conflict-torn states in terms of the varied resources and strategies – military, economic, and 
political – employed by states and non-state challengers. Paul Staniland, for instance, theorizes 
wartime political orders according to patterns of territorial control and cooperation between 
states and armed groups.26 Romain Malejacq adopts a similar approach to conceptualize forms of 
political order in failed states, emphasizing the relative internal and external resources available 
to warlords and states.27 However, as with other studies, Malejacq’s framework remains limited 
by the way he conceptualizes warlords’ resources along a single dimension that lumps together 
local and external/national-level sources of political power.28 We argue for the analytical utility 
of disaggregating these dimensions in order to better understand the varied quality and durability 
of ex-rebel authority. 
Overall, the existing literature usefully sheds light on the varied roles and behaviors of 
ex-rebel actors, and identifies a number of problems these individuals can create for 
peacebuilding efforts. What is missing, however, is an analytical framework capturing how and 
why local ex-rebel commanders’ authority is preserved, transformed, or swept aside after war’s 
end. Such an approach recognizes that these actors are not desirable or undesirable per se. 
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Rather, their roles in post-conflict reconstruction depend on the nature of their local authority. 
Former mid-tier rebel leaders are capable of creating or disrupting local social orders, and can 
either aid or hinder post-conflict reconstruction efforts guided by central governments and 
external interveners. 
 
A Typology of Ex-Rebel Authority  
We offer a “conceptual typology”29 describing the nature of mid-level ex-rebel authority in post-
conflict societies. The dimensions of our typology reflect two distinct sources of authority for 
former militant group commanders: local-level ties established with community residents, and 
national-level relationships with capital-based elites such as presidents or party leaders. Together 
these sources of authority impact whether and how ex-rebels provide local goods and sustain 
their power over time.  
In focusing on the “middle managers” of militant groups who are on the front lines of 
territorial governance, our analytical framework draws on previous studies of command-level 
actors in non-state armed groups.30  Most directly, we build on Themnér’s work on ex-mid-level 
commanders (ex-MiLCs).31 Like Themnér, we conceptualize mid-ranking ex-rebels as critical 
“brokers” who mediate resources and information up and down the political hierarchy in post-
conflict states. While Themnér focuses on the decision of commanders to remobilize armed 
networks, our typology captures a broader range of social and political roles for these actors. 
Specifically, we incorporate insights from anthropological studies in West Africa and elsewhere 
that conceptualize armed group commanders as types of local “patrons” who can be highly 
embedded in the communities they control.32 We assume that, while these individuals may have 
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diverse ideological agendas, mid-level former rebels seek to preserve and expand their local 
authority in the postwar period subject to the constraints of their political resources.33   
 
Local-level Ties  
Armed movements that aim to govern territory for a prolonged period of time require some level 
of support from civilian populations to ensure their success. In almost all civil wars, insurgents 
rely heavily on relationships with non-combatant populations for political support, the provision 
of material resources, and information regarding the activities of their military opponents.34 As 
individuals with decision-making power over rank-and-file fighters and resources that can be 
directed towards civilian welfare, mid-level commanders and political organizers are key nodes 
for the local-level ties that armed movements develop. After transitions to peace, ex-rebels often 
seek to sustain these local support networks in order to pursue their interests, for example to 
mobilize electoral support or to remobilize armed supporters.35 The strength of local-level ties 
that link ex-rebel commanders to civilian populations is therefore a crucial feature of the post-
conflict political environment.  
We conceive of “strong” local-level ties as the persistent social bonds that exist between 
mid-level ex-rebels and local populations after civil war, which are grounded in popular 
perceptions of legitimacy. By “legitimacy” we refer to the subjective view of a population 
regarding the appropriateness of sets of rules, institutions, or authority claims advanced by 
political actors and whether they should be obeyed.36 While violent coercion and monetary 
payoffs may be used, such ties go beyond “compliance as a function of raw power.”37 While 
coercion and authority can be difficult to distinguish in practice, strong local-level ties for ex-
rebels can be identified with several indicators: 1) commanders require a low degree of 
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monitoring to maintain civilian obedience, 2) civilian support is offered on a voluntary or 
spontaneous basis (e.g. expressing endorsement), and 3) civilian support is widespread across 
different social strata.38 Measuring these local-level ties requires detailed knowledge of militants’ 
interactions with civilian populations and the rationales underpinning civilian support. 
Strong local-level ties influence the exercise of ex-rebel authority after the transition to 
peace in two primary ways. First, the presence of strong local-level ties that intertwine local 
rebel leaders with community elites and residents is likely to increase the durability of ex-rebels’ 
authority. As state institutions are re-deployed across the national territory, the original wartime 
justifications for the presence of armed actors become more tenuous. Ex-rebel commanders may 
no longer monopolize violence and patronage in communities formerly under their control. In 
this situation, armed actors that can draw on a bottom-up reservoir of political capital will be 
better positioned to entrench their position and weather the post-conflict transition. Former 
militant leaders can find allies among community members in different positions, such as 
customary authorities, civil society organizations, trade unions, and religious leaders.39 By 
sustaining thick ties with these actors, ex-rebels have a firmer social base to stand on.  
Second, strong local-level ties can generate pressure on ex-rebels to exercise their 
authority in socially beneficial ways. Scholars have argued, for example, that when citizens and 
governance actors develop norms of reciprocity and occupy overlapping social spaces, it helps 
citizens monitor and sanction these public goods providers, encouraging cooperation and 
accountability.40 During transitions from war to peace, the local support and perceived 
legitimacy of former armed group commanders can similarly influence how these individuals 
exercise informal power as  “co-producers”41 of public goods. Enduring local-level ties provide a 
potential channel for civilians to make demands upon ex-rebels during peacetime, and to make 
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their continued acceptance of ex-rebel commanders’ presence and influence contingent on 
satisfactory governance performance. 
What determines whether the local-level ties of ex-rebel commanders and commissars 
will be strong or weak? To a large extent, the existence of strong linkages embedding ex-rebels 
within local communities are a function of the capacities and strategies pursued by armed 
movements during the conflict period.  In terms of concrete actions, armed actors can build 
relations with civilians through the provision of public goods and services such as security, 
education, health care and dispute resolution.42 Armed groups and their local commanders can 
also garner legitimacy using rhetorical appeals rooted in ideological worldviews, local belief 
systems, or identity-based grievances against exclusionary governments. Such practices can 
persuade local populations that the authority claims of armed actors are rightful and deserve to 
be respected.  
By contrast, where armed movements behave in a more opportunistic and predatory 
fashion during war, individuals associated with these movements are less likely to enjoy 
enduring local-level ties. Resource constraints, strategic conditions of the conflict, or corrupt 
leadership may limit opportunities for armed groups to provide goods and services, requiring 
local commanders to impel obedience through the threat of violence.43 Alternatively, armed 
movement organizers may obtain support by providing selective material benefits such as rent-
seeking opportunities for fighters or distributing patronage to community elites.44 These 
mechanisms of control may succeed in wartime. But they ultimately provide a more fragile basis 
for ex-rebel leaders’ local ties in the post-conflict period, since they are contingent on the ability 
to maintain a local monopoly on coercion and private patronage.   
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In sum, the creation of bonds of support and popular legitimacy that intertwine armed 
actors with local communities can help former rebels to sustain their power after the end of the 
conflict, and steer that power towards socially productive ends. Several caveats to this discussion 
are in order. First, the wartime practices of armed groups are rarely uniform across time and 
space. For example, despite its reputation for ruthlessness, the Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana (RENAMO) and their local commanders enjoyed a degree of popular legitimacy 
in stronghold areas in central Mozambique.45 Thus, identifying and measuring local-level ties 
among ex-rebels requires careful attention to conflict processes on the ground. Second, the link 
between armed actors’ behaviors during war and their popular legitimacy after transitions to 
peace is powerful but not deterministic. Over time, new opportunities to forge local support may 
arise for previously unpopular ex-rebels who are well-positioned to deliver the dividends of 
peace. This brings us to the second key factor shaping the durability of ex-rebel authority: the 
ability of local ex-rebel leaders to derive political support from relationships to the post-conflict 
state.  
 
National-level Ties 
The second dimension of our typology is the strength or weakness or ex-rebels’ ties to national-
level elites. Elite-level social networks play important roles in post-conflict states, which are 
often characterized by weak formal institutions, intense political competition, and swiftly 
changing alliances among former belligerents.  Amid this fluid political terrain, the success or 
failure of local ex-rebel bosses to develop and sustain relationships with allies based in national 
capitals will also impinge on their ability to exert influence. Unlike rank-and-file fighters, mid-
level commanders and organizers are well-positioned to develop ties with capital-based power 
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holders. These individuals often come from the same pre-conflict social milieux as their national-
level counterparts, and control access to networks of subordinates that can be leveraged to strike 
up alliances with state elites.46 In practice, national-level ties can be measured in terms of formal 
support from capital-based leaders (e.g. appointments or endorsements), as well as access to 
patronage controlled by the state.  
  Relationships with national-level elites are meaningful in two main ways. First, they 
grant former armed group commanders privileged access to material resources. Central 
governments in post-conflict states, usually in partnership with international allies and 
peacebuilding agencies, often channel state resources through armed brokers in the periphery as 
an expedient means of purchasing stability and exerting influence in difficult-to-reach areas.47 
Though state elites and external peacebuilders may not desire it, ex-rebels can leverage these 
resources distributed from the center in ways that strengthen their authority locally. For example, 
development aid and infrastructure spending can be targeted to political supporters to create or 
enlarge ex-rebels’ clientelist networks. State personnel, such as police forces or tax officials, can 
also be repurposed to serve the interests of ex-rebels, for example by shielding their economic 
activities from legal scrutiny.48 Armed actors formally associated with the state can also gain 
privileged access to international markets, feeding their illicit resource businesses.49  
 Beyond these material benefits, ties to national-level elites allow local ex-rebel leaders to 
consolidate their authority by exploiting the discourse and imagery of legal-rational authority.50 
As Pierre Englebert argues, legal-rational discourses (or “legal command”) represent an 
especially powerful tool for domination in post-colonial states that are first-and-foremost 
products of de jure recognition by other actors in the international system, rather than a result of 
internal processes of state-making.51 Even in extreme cases of institutional atrophy, such as in 
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the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or northern Mali, peripheral governance actors 
often rely on legal command to “order people around,” mobilize resources, and buttress their 
authority at regional and local levels.52 Affiliation with formal state institutions can also make 
governance actors appear more autonomous and independent of private interests.53 Individuals 
who can claim to represent “the state,” therefore, will possess significant advantages over 
competitors. 
As states transition from civil war to peacetime politics, ex-rebels and other wielders of 
local authority participate in intense re-negotiations over access to the benefits associated with 
sovereign statehood.54 Ex-rebel commanders who are successful in establishing national-level 
alliances can access material and symbolic resources that were previously unattainable, allowing 
them to expand networks of patronage, direct armed state personnel to their benefit, and employ 
legal-rational imagery as a tool of domination. Ex-rebels who are disconnected from patrons 
within the capital-based government, by contrast, may be perceived as being outside the law, and 
will be more vulnerable to pressures from competing local elites and from international 
peacebuilders.  
 
Combining the Dimensions: Trajectories of Ex-Rebel Authority 
Figure 1 brings these local- and national-level dimensions together and categorizes the resulting 
types of authority. We characterize these trajectories in terms of how mid-level ex-rebels 
continue to provide social goods within local communities, and the likely durability of their 
authority over time.  
In areas where the local support base of ex-rebels is weak, and the authority of former 
armed actors is not buttressed by vertical ties to the post-conflict state (upper-left quadrant), ex-
 
 
14 
rebels’ local authority is characterized by predation. Without a reservoir of political capital 
among citizens or strong relationships with local community leaders, ex-rebels are unconstrained 
by a pre-existing social contract with local civilians. To the extent that ex-rebel bosses in these 
areas continue to exert authority, they are likely to direct their effort primarily towards extorting 
local populations rather than providing public goods. At the same time, without formal 
recognition of their position, ex-rebel actors can no longer “mask” their activities behind the 
veneer of quasi-statehood. This combination of weak local support and a lack of vertical linkages 
produces an unstable form of authority centered on clandestine forms of extraction and coercion. 
This situation describes the position of former militia group leaders in several peripheral areas of 
Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia. Predatory forms of ex-rebel 
authority are ultimately brittle. They are unlikely to endure in the face of determined efforts by 
local populations to push ex-rebels out, or efforts by central governments to restore a monopoly 
on goods provision.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
In the benevolent warlordism scenario (upper-right quadrant), ex-rebel commanders 
benefit from strong local-level ties but lack the resources and formal recognition of their 
authority that come from alliances with national-level actors. Control over core public goods 
(such as security) remains concentrated in the hands of former rebel actors, but this authority is 
exercised primarily through informal channels. A strong social contract between ex-rebels and 
local populations allows former commanders to draw on community resources and supporters, 
and they may even invest in local development. Armed power-brokers in parts of Somalia, 
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Afghanistan, and Liberia are examples of this category. In some cases, ex-rebels in situations of 
benevolent warlordism possess pro-forma connections to the state (for example through military 
commissions), but they exercise their authority well beyond their formal job descriptions. This 
form of ex-rebel authority often exists in parallel with new state institutions, presenting a 
complementary — and potentially rivalrous — source of governing authority. The authority of 
ex-rebels under benevolent warlordism is more resilient than in situations of predation, but can 
still be challenged from above if state elites decide to revoke their tacit acceptance of ex-rebels’ 
local power. 
State capture occurs where armed groups fail to cultivate local bases of support during 
civil war, but where the authority of ex-rebel commanders is elevated through national-level ties 
to the post-conflict state (bottom-left quadrant). Former militant leaders may be nominated as 
candidates for ruling political parties, or appointed to bureaucratic or security sector positions 
that give them formal governing powers. Ex-rebels in the state capture scenario lack popular 
constraints on their authority and can use their affiliation with the state to shield their 
participation in illicit economies and other criminal behavior.  In some instances of state capture, 
ex-militants’ new linkages to the state facilitate the de-territorialization of their local power base. 
Without perceived legitimacy among the population, these ex-rebels may “retreat to the 
barracks” (or the prefectoral office) and withdraw from pockets of territory that are difficult to 
govern. As such, former militants may have quite limited influence over local security and goods 
provisions. This is the case with many ex-rebel commanders in postwar Côte d’Ivoire, whose 
authority is now seen as distant and “corrupted” in the eyes of local populations. Although the 
state capture type of authority can endure in the short-term, the absence of local popular backing 
also makes ex-rebels vulnerable to potential challenge by other politicians capable of mobilizing 
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broad-based support. Recognition of authority can also be withdrawn by national-level elites if 
ex-rebels are unable to advance the interests of their capital-based allies or function as loyal 
political brokers.  
 In the final category of rebels-into-statesmen (bottom-right quadrant), local ex-rebel 
leaders combine strong local support with the material and ideational advantages derived from 
alliances with state elites. This configuration of authority promotes the most far-reaching 
institutionalization of ex-rebel power. Former militants are likely to remain involved in a broad 
range of goods provision, and can draw on myriad resources to operate effectively inside the 
formal political arena and ward off challengers. This trajectory describes the war-to-peace 
transformations of well-entrenched ex-rebel commanders and commissars in several areas of 
Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and Uganda. 
Given the tendency of these theoretical types to cluster together across space, we 
conceptualize these trajectories at the sub-national level — i.e. across villages, towns, and 
localities. Of course, these ideal types are intended as conceptual heuristics and need not be 
mutually exclusive. In reality, within any specific locality there may be elements of different 
categories mixed together.  
 
Illustrating the Typology: Ex-Rebel Authority in Côte d’Ivoire 
Studying the war-to-peace transition in Côte d’Ivoire provides a unique opportunity to trace the 
trajectories of ex-rebel authority described by our theoretical typology. Several aspects of the 
Ivorian case provide analytical leverage. First, the decentralized nature of the Forces Nouvelles 
(FN) rebellion allows us to isolate local-level patterns within the broader case. From 2002 to 
2011 the FN occupied the northern half of the country, while the government of Laurent Gbagbo 
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retained administrative control over the south. In rebel territory, the FN developed a complex 
governance structure that coordinated rebel activity, mobilized resources, and worked with local 
communities to provide public goods such as security, education and dispute resolution.55 Rebel 
forces divided their territory into ten administrative com’zones, and zone and sector commanders 
– along with FN civilian delegates – enjoyed substantial autonomy. The decentralized character 
of the FN occupation led to significant variations in the quality of FN governance and the 
relationships formed between local FN leaders and occupied populations.  
Second, post-conflict peacebuilding in Côte d’Ivoire produced wide-ranging 
constellations of local order that incorporate former militants in highly varied ways. Many 
former FN commanders remained locally influential after the fall of Gbagbo’s government 
following the 2010-2011 electoral crisis, despite efforts by the government of Alassane Ouattara 
to dismantle the FN wartime structure.56 Other ex-FN members faded from the public spotlight, 
or shifted into formal government positions that altered the resources available to them. 
Leveraging these sources of variation within a single case allows us to parse out the role of ex-
rebels’ local- and national-level ties for their postwar trajectories of authority, while holding 
constant factors such as group ideology.  
Our analysis draws on extensive field research, including over one hundred interviews 
with politicians, bureaucrats, former rebel group members, community leaders and citizens. 
These interviews were conducted over a three-month period from June to August 2017 across 
dozens of sous-préfectures (the smallest administrative unit in Côte d’Ivoire) in former rebel-
held areas, and in different neighborhoods of Bouaké and Korhogo, the two largest cities 
occupied by the rebellion.57 We selected research sites on the basis of a convenience sample of 
sous-préfectures, with an aim towards gathering evidence from diverse socioeconomic and 
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ethnolinguistic regions in rebel-held territory, as well as urban and rural areas. In each locality, 
we conducted at least one structured interview with a community leader — for instance a village 
chief or civil society leader — using a standardized questionnaire that included factual questions 
about the rebel occupation and the post-conflict political roles of former FN leaders in the 
community.58 This data was triangulated with additional, semi-structured interviews with 
citizens, government officials, and former rebel members either in the sous-préfecture or the 
regional capital, using snowball-sampling.59  
 
Predation. Where local-level support for ex-rebel leaders is weak, and ties to national-level 
political networks are absent, the resulting outcome is predation. The sub-prefecture of Kpata in 
western Côte d’Ivoire illustrates the predation category. Located in the rugged mountains north-
east of the city of Man in the Tonkpi region, Kpata fell under the control of the zone commander 
Losseni Fofana during the rebellion. Unlike in the zone capital of Man, however, the local Forces 
Nouvelles chef de poste in Kpata (known to residents as “Bava”) showed little  
concern for the well-being of the population. Several episodes of violent repression against the 
population occurred in the early months of the FN occupation, and civilians spoke of the frequent 
mistreatment of community members, including elders and women, at the hands of FN forces.60 
Kpata was one of the few localities we visited where a local youth militia, and not the FN 
commander, took on the primary role of providing security and policing during the rebel 
occupation.61  
After the post-conflict transition, few FN members in Kpata integrated into the national 
army or other state positions. The chef de poste found himself cut adrift from national leaders, 
and continued to organize his subordinates to operate informal road checkpoints in the area to 
 
 
19 
levy taxes, especially during the first two years of the post-conflict transition.62 However, Bava 
and his fighters were no longer attached to a larger organizational superstructure that justified 
their extraction. The ex-commander’s predatory behavior placed him and his fighters in a 
precarious position vis-a-vis the population, and over time community leaders began to call on 
the re-deployed police and gendarmerie forces to intervene. One village elder explained, “Here 
the rebels continued to run their barrages on the roads, they had nothing else to do … We have 
no police station here, so it is still hard. But they are not so powerful anymore.”63  
A similar trajectory occurred for local ex-rebel leaders in the region of Worodougou and 
its capital Séguéla. In this region, the majority of the Malinké population initially shared the 
political goals of the rebellion and many local inhabitants enrolled in the FN. The Worodougou 
region is peripheral and poor, but its gold and diamond mining sites were a major source of 
revenue for the FN. Rebel commanders and political delegates in this area, such as Issiaka 
Ouattara and Mamadou Bakayoko, respected the authority of local Rassemblement des 
républicains (RDR) politicians and Malinké chiefs, and had difficulty challenging their position 
of power.64 As a result, the scope of FN governance remained narrow. 
The influence of former FN leaders in Séguéla diminished rapidly after the end of the 
civil war in 2011. Senior former commanders who reintegrated into the army involved 
themselves primarily in the illegal exploitation of natural resources, activities which took place 
in remote areas far from the paved road. However, local authorities (particularly the re-deployed 
prefectoral corps) did not approve of these illegal actions and were effective at curbing them, 
particularly in the case of diamond mining.65 Interviewees in the region stress that today, former 
rebel leaders seem to have lost interest in Séguéla. As one local administrator said, “there are a 
few former soldiers of commander Wattao [Issiaka Ouattara] who are still there, but they are not 
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many. After the election, the FN wanted to be close to Abidjan, the centre of political power, in 
order to have their share of the cake ... here they came to enrich themselves and leave.”66 
Demobilized combatants in Séguéla expressed similar frustration that their commanders seem to 
have lost any interest in them.67 
Two related dynamics appear to have curtailed ex-rebel authority in Séguéla. First, the 
FN’s limited success in providing social goods during the occupation weakened the popularity of 
former rebel commanders in the area. Local officials explained that many residents remembered 
FN governance as a period of arbitrary rule and sometimes brutal violence, and few politicians 
wanted to sustain an alliance with former FN commanders.68 Second, the re-establishment of 
RDR party hegemony in the region “crowded out” the ability of politically ambitious FN leaders 
to formalize their local positions in the post-conflict state.69   
The predation trajectory can be found in other post-conflict states. In Colombia, for 
example, local leaders of paramilitary groups experienced similar difficulties sustaining authority 
following the process of demobilization. In 1999, the Bloque Catatumbo (BC), a faction of the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), occupied the municipality of Tibú in the department 
of Norte del Santander. BC commanders relied largely on violence and intimidation to enforce 
control,70 and did little to consolidate a strong social base among the population.71 The BC 
retained control of the Tibú municipality until their demobilization in 2004,72 but their power 
remained predicated on violence and economic extortion.73 Because the group did not build 
legitimacy during the armed conflict, ex-paramilitary commanders lacked strong social ties or 
support among the local population. Vertical ties between BC field commanders and Colombian 
political elites, meanwhile, which constituted a major source of support for paramilitaries, grew 
weaker when the Colombian government withdrew its support to the AUC and curbed legal 
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impunity for paramilitaries. Over time, the authority of local BC leaders receded and their units 
disintegrated. In the words of one former combatant, “all of my compañeros went their own 
ways. Nothing remained.”74  
 
Benevolent Warlordism. In cases where ex-rebels enjoy strong ties to local communities but 
lack support from national-level leaders, the outcome is benevolent warlordism. This category 
characterizes several regions in Côte d’Ivoire where FN rebels developed sophisticated 
governance systems and collaborated with local elites. Although some former FN commanders 
in these areas were affiliated with the state via their positions in the national army, their local 
influence is largely unrelated to their official duties.  
In Katiola, the capital of the Hambol region, the former zone commander Herve Touré 
(“Vetcho”) remains a powerful figure in local governance. At the outbreak of the rebellion in 
2002, Vetcho became the sector commander in the nearby department of Dabakala before being 
promoted to zone commander in Katiola in 2004.75 Vetcho’s appointment brought a considerable 
improvement in the relations between the FN and the local population in Katiola, which were 
strained under the previous commander.76 Vetcho’s efforts to restore basic services in the city, 
combined with the fact that Vetcho was a “son of the land” — born and raised in Katiola — 
helped to restore the confidence of the population in the FN’s political project. According to a 
traditional chief in Katiola, “we had a lot of discussions with him, he explained us his political 
mission. He said that everyone could call him if there were problems. He was always very 
approachable.”77 Youth from the local ethnic group, the Tagbana, started joining the FN in 
significant numbers only after Vetcho’s arrival.78  
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Although Vetcho left Katiola after the end of the rebellion in order to rejoin the Agence 
nationale de stratégie et d'intelligence (ANSI), and was later promoted in 2014 to be the 
commander of the third infantry battalion of the Ivorian army stationed in Bouaké, his informal 
ties to the community in Katiola remained strong. Vetcho continues to visit Katiola periodically 
in a private capacity. During these visits, he meets with traditional authorities and attends social 
ceremonies. He is also known to provide financial assistance to his former fighters, and “bring 
help to the population.”79 Community leaders and local government officials in Katiola also 
solicit Vetcho to address problems of criminality and disorder among former FN elements living 
in the region.80 
However, strained relations with the central government threaten the local authority of 
ex-FN members like Vetcho. State authorities tolerate Vetcho’s influence in Katiola insofar as he 
can help the Ouattara regime to keep former combatants in the region under control, an issue that 
has taken on increased urgency in the wake of several army mutinies and ex-combatant protests 
in 2014 and 2017.81 But Vetcho could always be relocated outside the region in the future if the 
Ouattara government decided that his informal authority represents a threat to the state. Recent 
events in the city of Korhogo illustrate this possibility. The powerful ex-zone commander Fofié 
Kouakou Martin exercised considerable influence in Korhogo after 2011, in part due to his 
record of effective service provision during the civil war. Yet by 2016 Fofié’s authority 
prompted the Ouattara government to re-position Fofié to Daloa in the Haut Sassandra region in 
order to weaken his ties to armed supporters.82  
 In neighboring Liberia, some armed group commanders followed a similar pathway of 
benevolent warlordism after the conclusion of the country’s second civil war in 2003. On the 
Guthrie rubber plantation, militants organized by a former Liberians United for Reconciliation 
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and Democracy (LURD) major, Sumo Dennis, took a number of steps to build local legitimacy, 
including developing a sophisticated organizational structure for managing the activities of 
rubber tappers and mediating disputes within the communities they controlled.83  However, the 
fact that the Liberian state did not codify the authority of former LURD commanders jeopardized 
the political position of these ex-rebels over time. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, elected in 2006, made 
the repossession of Guthrie and other “irregular” rubber plantations in Liberia a top priority.84 
Although former LURD commanders retained significant local power in Guthrie after the post-
conflict transition, the absence of strong national-level ties to members of the post-conflict state 
ultimately left them vulnerable to displacement. 
 
State Capture . State capture occurs where militants’ local ties to the population are weak, 
but commanders bolster their authority through vertical ties to the post-conflict state. We 
observed state capture in several localities in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. In the central region of 
Gbeké and in northeastern Bounkani, for example, local populations viewed the presence of the 
rebels as an abusive occupation, rather than a liberating force. In Gbeké, most of the population 
is Baoulé, a group that historically supported the old ruling party, the Parti Démocratique de la 
Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI).  From the start, many Baoulé in Gbeké showed scant enthusiasm for what 
they perceived as a “northern” rebellion. Although they had no particular sympathy for president 
Laurent Gbagbo either, relatively few Baoulé joined the FN, and the relationship between the 
local population and the FN was strained during the occupation.85 In the department of Béoumi, 
for example, violence against civilians by FN elements was common despite the efforts of the 
local FN commander to discipline his troops and prevent abuses.86  
 
 
24 
In the aftermath of the war in 2011, some former FN commanders and civilian leaders in 
the Gbeké region accepted positions within the military, police and gendarmes, or took up 
elected positions. Others left to take up appointments elsewhere. Among commanders who 
remained in the area, their activities were limited to their official duties in the security forces, 
such as military training exercises and police patrols. Community leaders and citizens in the 
villages of Béoumi, Sakassou and Djébonoua described very limited interactions with former FN 
leaders, who no longer visited these smaller localities or figured prominently in local politics.87 
In the village of Botro, a civil society leader explained that “since the reunification, the rebel 
com-secteur now works as the gendarmerie commandant. His men don’t terrorize us anymore, 
really we do not see him much at all.”88  
Post-conflict order in the northeastern region of Bounkani illustrates another variant of 
state capture. As in Gbéké, pre-conflict political alignments in Bounkani and poor wartime 
governance performance hindered the ability of the FN to legitimize its authority. The 
relationship between Bounkani’s Lobi population and the FN was fraught with tension. Many 
Lobi felt that FN rule, particularly the system of taxation installed by the rebel commanders, 
unfairly targeted Lobi leaders, traders and farmers.89  
Since the removal of Laurent Gbagbo in 2011, former FN leaders have exercised 
authority in this region through formal appointments by the Ouattara government. After 
accepting a command position within the Ivorian special forces in Abidjan, the former zone 
commander stationed in the regional capital of Bouna during the civil war, Morou Ouattara, was 
reassigned back to Bounkani as the of the head of the battalion responsible for security in the 
east (BSE).  Tuo Fozié, the former director of the police and gendarmerie for the FN, became the 
Prefect for the Department of Bouna and the administrative Region of Bounkani. And Philippe 
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Hien, who played a central role as part of the FN to resolve tensions between the rebels and the 
Lobi community during the conflict, is the current head of the conseil régional for Bounkani. 
Finally, the former zone commander in Séguela, Issiaka Ouattara (“Wattao”), remains a political 
fixture in his hometown of Doropo, where he is implicated in illicit gold mining activities. As the 
commander of the Republican Guard corps, Issiaka Ouattara can command considerable state 
resources and shield himself from official scrutiny.90 
Despite their strong national-level ties and near-monopoly over local state positions, ex-
rebels in Bounkani have struggled to provide political order and limit post-conflict violence. 
Since the reunification of the country, for example,  conflicts over land use have pitted Lobi 
farmers against the Peul and indigenous Koulango, leading to a set of violent clashes in March 
2016 that left more than twenty people dead and displaced thousands to refugee camps in 
Burkina Faso.91 The inability or unwillingness of the local political class, including Morou 
Ouattara, “Wattao,” Fozié, and Philippe to resolve these conflicts over land, coupled with the 
manipulation of local elections and the ongoing involvement of former rebels in illicit 
transborder trade, have fed the view among local residents that these ex-rebels have “hijacked” 
the state to their own benefit and to the detriment of many living in Bounkani.92 
Several Afghan warlords who led armed factions during the civil wars of the 1990s and 
who parachuted into regional government offices after 2004 illustrate additional cases of state 
capture. For instance, Gul Agha Sherzai, the governor of Nangarhar Province from 2005 to 2013, 
and currently a minister in the Afghan government, owed his appointment as provincial ruler to 
his strong ties with president Hamid Karzai and with the U.S. military. Sherzai was a co-ethnic 
Pashtun of the local population but had “no pre-existing base of power in the province and relied 
on the support of the regime to establish himself as new strongman in town.”93 Sherzai took 
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advantage of opportunities to broker new alliances with local middlemen and accumulate 
political power, but the governor’s sphere of control remained limited. As with other cases of 
state capture, the authority of these ex-rebels “reflected a negotiated management, not a 
monopolization, of coercion.”94  
 
Rebels-into-Statesmen. Rebels-into-statesmen describes cases where ex-rebels buttress 
their authority with local social bases and national-level linkages. In Côte d’Ivoire, FN members 
turned rebels-into-statesmen were often local commissars and delegates affiliated with the 
civilian wing of the rebellion, who leveraged their record of wartime governance to launch 
careers in electoral politics.95 For example, in the region of Poro, whose capital Korhogo was the 
second largest city controlled by the rebellion, the civilian branch of the FN was able to establish 
a positive record of local governance. While other civilian branches of the FN existed more on 
paper than in practice, the Korhogo branch played a significant role since 2002 when it became 
the cabinet civile. From 2002 to 2011, the local FN administration involved themselves in a 
broad range of local affairs, from health and education to divorce disputes. They also played a 
key coordinating role for civil society groups and international organizations such as the UN 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) working in Korhogo.96   
Popular support “from below” and vertical linkages “from above” interacted and 
reinforced ex-rebel power in the Poro region. The legitimacy that the FN derived from their 
relatively effective governance record established an enduring base of local support that helped 
some of its members to engage in political careers. These members included Kanigui Soro, who 
was the former delegate general of the FN in Korhogo, and Alphonse Soro.97 Both Kanigui and 
Alphonse were elected to parliament in 2011, representing constituencies in the Poro Region. 
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Kanigui and Alphonse also enjoyed strong personal relationships the former FN Secretary 
General and current President of the National Assembly, Guillaume Soro, from their time as 
members of the national student union Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire 
(FESCI). President Alassane Ouattara’s party, the RDR, also endorsed former rebel candidates in 
Poro. These national-level ties allowed ex-rebels like Kanigui and Alphonse to expand their 
patronage power and associate themselves with the post-conflict state after 2011. 
 Of course, even rebels-turned-statesmen are not immune from challenges. In Côte 
d’Ivoire, sustaining support from the ruling Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la 
démocratie et la paix (RHDP) is a central challenge for many ex-FN members. As in the case of 
Séguéla, the ruling party establishment has sometimes stifled the political ambitions of former 
FN. As Kanigui Soro explained: “in some localities, the [RDR] politicians have come back after 
the crisis and they ended up in competition with the FN.”98 Challenges to the local political 
authority of ex-rebels in Poro have increased leading up to the 2020 Presidential elections in 
Côte d’Ivoire, as a result of the growing national-level political rivalry between Ouattara and 
Guillaume Soro, with whom many mid-level ex-rebels remained politically affiliated.99 
Nevertheless, ex-FN members with sufficient local legitimacy have proven to be resourceful 
political actors. Kanigui, for example, managed to be re-elected in 2016 as an independent 
candidate, after the RHDP disavowed his candidacy.100  
The rebels-into-statesmen trajectory garners significant attention from scholars in 
political science.101 Across Africa and Asia, ex-rebels associated with armed liberation 
movements and the “reformist insurgencies” of the 1970s and 1980s that took power through 
guerrilla warfare are typical cases of this category.102 In Zimbabwe, for example, wartime 
mobilization tactics by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) – including revolutionary 
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meetings (pungwes), and appeals to local religious “spirit mediums” – provided a popular base 
for ZANU members who transitioned into local politics. In the Dande district, local ZANU 
Political Commissars adopted many of the community roles previously reserved for village 
chiefs, such as establishing village committees and enforcing moral codes.103 After ZANU 
guerrillas took power in 1980, many ZANU members gained status at the ward and district level 
as elected politicians and local party bosses.104 To reinforce their authority, ex-ZANU 
commissars leveraged their connections to the ZANU-PF party-state, which sought to extend the 
party structure throughout rural areas.105 According to Kriger, for example, ZANU party 
organizers who had previously operated “guerrilla courts” during the liberation war enjoyed the 
blessing and resources of the central party committee after 1980, and “took it on themselves to 
punish people who did not obey party rules.”106 The confluence of local-level ties and strong 
connections to the central state helps to explain the resiliency of ex-ZANU members’ grip on 
rural politics in much of Zimbabwe over thirty years after the end of the liberation war. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In many post-war societies, middle-ranking ex-rebel members remain influential political actors 
long after the transition to peace. Few studies, however, have theorized ex-rebel authority in 
terms of the different political resources available to these actors. By unpacking ex-rebel 
authority along its local and national-level dimensions, this paper engages in the conceptual work 
necessary for a more nuanced understanding of how post-conflict political orders are generated 
and sustained in practice. Sub-national evidence from northern Côte d’Ivoire illustrates the 
variety of outcomes captured by our typology. Our analysis can also be applied to other cases of 
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post-conflict transitions that involve anti-state rebellions, secessionist insurgencies, or other 
militias that govern territory and operate autonomously from the state.107 
Although our approach in this article is inductive and concept-oriented rather than theory-
testing, our typology invites a research agenda focused on developing more nuanced models of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. We identify three streams for future work.  
First, more research is needed to understand the preservation or decline of militants’ local 
ties to civilians during war-to-peace transitions. Co-ethnic ties and levels of coercive control 
have received the most attention in the civil wars literature,108 yet these factors do not fully 
explain the endurance of ex-rebels’ local-level ties. In the course of our fieldwork, we visited 
areas where the local support for co-ethnic rebels largely faded away after the end of the conflict, 
such as in Séguéla. By contrast, in areas such as Man in western Côte d’Ivoire, nordiste FN 
rebels did not share co-ethnic ties with the local Yacouba population, but local zone and sector 
commanders nevertheless succeeded in garnering allegiance and perceived legitimacy.109 Future 
research ought to rigorously examine the effects of wartime governance performance and 
individual rebel commander leadership on the durability of social contracts between rebels and 
civilians, factors that have received scant attention by political science scholars.  
Second, the strategies of postwar state elites – who may choose to empower ex-rebels in 
some areas but not others – merits further attention. What explains states’ strategic choices? Here 
scholars might examine the role of pre-war social networks among armed group members, as 
well as processes of wartime socialization.110 In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, former FN 
commanders and civilian delegates with pre-war connections to Guillaume Soro’s student union, 
FESCI, or to President Alassane Ouattara’s political circles, were often favored by the postwar 
regime and promoted to coveted state positions. Wartime cooperation between local commanders 
 
 
30 
and national elites aligned with armed factions may also produce enduring bonds that last into 
the peacetime era, and forge the basis for links between peripheral areas and the capital. Finally, 
the interaction between ex-rebels’ local-level and national-level ties deserves further exploration. 
For example, ex-rebels with reputations for effective service delivery might be well-positioned to 
garner national-level ties in the post-conflict period, as capital-based elites seek to align 
themselves with effective local brokers.111  
Third, our typology suggests the need for more nuanced theorizing about the implications 
of ex-militant authority for statebuilding, democratization, and development. Different forms of 
ex-rebel authority are likely to have different consequences for post-conflict reconstruction. 
Predation appears to be the most disruptive form of authority, with unconstrained ex-rebel 
leaders operating largely in the shadows with few mechanisms of accountability. At the same 
time, predatory ex-rebels can be swept away relatively easily by a post-conflict regime 
concerned with asserting its power. The rebel-into-statesmen trajectory, by contrast, can produce 
enduring patterns of authority, with potentially positive implications for stability and 
statebuilding.  However, the rebels-into-statesmen category has equivocal consequences for 
democracy: powerful ex-rebel actors may employ their considerable resources to steamroll 
political rivals and restrict electoral competition.112 While the creation of governing parties by 
former rebels can contribute to meaningful political competition, this may be limited to cases 
where insurgents’ takeover of the state is not total. The consequences of highly entrenched ex-
rebel authority for other aspects of local democracy – such as civic engagement and women’s 
political participation – also merit future study. 
The consequences of the benevolent warlordism and the state capture scenarios are the 
most ambiguous and under-researched. On the one hand, socially-embedded military strongmen 
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can benefit communities in the short term, helping to establish local order and providing 
livelihoods to the population.113 In this sense, Malejacq is correct when he argues that warlords 
“may exercise a type of authority that is more durable and flexible” than what central states and 
international peacebuilders can supply.114 However, benevolent warlordism is likely to hinder 
centralized statebuilding and the uniform consolidation of public authority in the long run, 
maintaining the post-conflict state in a suboptimal equilibrium of weak authority and potentially 
unstable hybrid governance. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, some ex-rebel commanders who 
remained popular among local populations, such as Fofié Kouakou Martin, emerged as serious 
threats in the eyes of the Ouattara government.115 By contrast, the state capture scenario may be 
preferable from the perspective of the central regime, even as it leads to the alienation of the 
local population from a post-conflict state that is perceived as distant and illegitimate. Thus, 
simply identifying the existence of political authority in the hands of ex-rebels is insufficient for 
drawing firm distinctions between “strong” and “weak” states. Instead, scholars should explore 
the potential tradeoffs between co-opting ex-rebel power brokers to achieve national stability, on 
the one hand, and achieving local order and development, on the other.  
Policy-makers who aim to support economic recovery, social cohesion, and state 
capacity-building after civil wars cannot avoid confronting the local authority of ex-rebel actors. 
In some cases, this means channeling external resources through these individuals and 
incorporating them directly into peacebuilding initiatives when they are best-positioned to 
oversee their implementation, as with demobilization and reintegration programmes.  But 
navigating ex-rebel actors effectively requires a nuanced understanding of how these individuals 
sustain their authority and to what ends. Former militants who are locally embedded can present 
a conundrum. These actors can use their local influence and mobilization power (along with 
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peacebuilding resources) as bargaining leverage to resist accountability to elected leaders. 
Subordinating these actors to the state may require more than their pro-forma integration into 
formal military or civil service positions. Eventually, central governments must successfully 
supplant the roles of these ex-rebels as guarantors of social order and basic goods provision 
within their areas of influence.116 In cases where ex-rebels exercise authority primarily via their 
national-level ties, they may not be effective interlocutors for restoring state legitimacy in the 
eyes of local citizens. External peacebuilders who channel resources through these ex-rebel 
actors may inadvertently contribute to the erosion of a more meaningful social contract between 
citizens and the post-conflict state.    
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